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Abstract
Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems are industrial automation systems that remotely
monitor and control critical infrastructures. SCADA
systems are major targets for espionage and sabotage
attackers. Current commercial o↵-the-shelf security solutions are insufficient in protecting SCADA systems
against sophisticated cyber-attacks. Furthermore, these
breaches are not detected in real-time or fast enough to
prevent further damages. To address this challenge we
present a feasibility study that proves monitoring power
consumption of SCADA devices is an e↵ective approach
to detect cyber-attacks. We built a testbed containing
a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) that was instrumented to record its power usage. Three SCADAspecific cyber-attacks were simulated and we report the
power consumption of the PLC under these normal and
anomalous scenarios. We show that it is possible to distinguish the PLC power utilization between these scenarios. In route to this result we found and describe
vulnerabilities in the DF-1 protocol.

1.

Introduction

SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition)
systems refer to control systems that are used to monitor and control enterprise-wide operations of large-scale
and distributed critical infrastructures. For example,
SCADA systems are widely used to monitor electrical
assets (i.e., substations and transformer), telecommunication facilities (i.e., switches and transmitters), water
and waste equipment (i.e., water pumps and valves) and
oil and gas pipelines (i.e., gas pumps and valves). Usually SCADA systems contain a set of devices such as sensors, actuators, programmable logic controllers (PLCs),
remote terminal units (RTUs), human machine inter⇤
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faces (HMIs), and master terminal units (MTUs).
Attackers can compromise SCADA systems by exploiting vulnerabilities residing in security policies, software, communication channels, wireless channels, and
social engineering. Recently, SCADA systems have
become a target for cyber-attacks, according to a recent report from the Organization of American States
(OAS) [1] , due to their potential impacts on properties,
economies, and human lives. The annual threat report
from Dell shows that cyber-attacks against SCADA systems increased from 91,676 to 163,228 between January
2012 to January 2013 and increased to 675,186 at the
end of January 2014 [2].
Specific, recent examples producing widespread damage include:
• In 2000, a disgruntled employee compromised the
Maroochy Shire (Queensland computerized waste
management system) causing millions of gallons
of sewage spill into waterways, local parks and
rivers [3].
• In 2010, a worm called Stuxnet [4] was detected
in Iranian uranium enrichment facilities. This
worm increased the operating speed of the Iranian IR-1 centrifuge from 1,064 Hz to 1,410 Hz
for fifteen minutes before returning to its normal
running frequency [5, 6]. This incident temporarily derailed Iran’s nuclear program by destroying
roughly 1,000 centrifuges.
• In 2013, a cyber-espionage group known as “Dragonfly” used phishing sites and Trojans to compromise more than 1,000 energy supplier organizations in Europe and North America [7].
In this paper, we demonstrate a new approach to
monitor and analyze the power consumption of a
SCADA device (e.g., PLC) in order to detect SCADAspecific cyber-attacks. Our primary goal is to prove
that there are detectable di↵erences in the power profiles between normal behavior and behavior when under
cyber-attacks. We describe a SCADA testbed that enabled us to monitor and collect the power consumption
of a PLC under normal operations, command injection
attacks, denial of service attacks, and replay attacks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review on detection tech-
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niques for identifying SCADA-specific cyber-attacks.
Section 3 describes the experimental design (hardware
and software configuration). Section 4 introduces the
approach to collect PLC power consumption data. Section 5 validates our proposed approach by analyzing
power consumption data under various scenarios. Finally, we present our conclusions and suggestions for
future work in Section 6.

2.

Related Work

The SCADA-specific cyber-attacks introduced in Section 1 show that traditional prevention mechanisms such
as firewalls and anti-virus software are not enough to
protect SCADA systems against sophisticated cyberattacks. Researchers therefore are focusing on specific
techniques to defend SCADA systems in depth. For example, Chen et al. [8, 9] adopted the idea of autonomic
computing and created self-protecting systems that can
estimate known attacks before they impact devices in
the network. If an attack bypasses an Intrusion Detection System (IDS), a second line of defense provides
patterns of known attacks to an Intrusion Response System (IRS). A controller in the IRS evaluates candidate
protection mechanisms considering pre-defined criteria
and then selects the optimal protection mechanisms to
regulate system behavior back to normal. Unknown attack patterns were investigated by an online-learning
module and were sent to the IRS similar to the known
attack scenario. As the result, the self-protecting systems were validated to protect SCADA systems against
both known and unknown attacks in near real-time with
little or no human intervention.
Rule-based signature techniques are commonly used
to detect SCADA-specific cyber-attacks. Particularly,
this technique is often adopted to detect those cyberattacks that interrupt, fabricate, intercept or modify
communication messages between the HMI and PLC. H.
Bao et al. [10] proposed a behavior rule-based methodology monitoring devices in the smart grid for insider
threat detection. Results showed that this approach
could detect abnormal behaviors in pervasive smart grid
applications. However, the number of rules for detecting polymorphic and metamorphic malware can be extremely large. Thus, a more efficient approach must be
developed to speedup the detection and enhance accuracy.
The objective of this research paper is to prove the
concept that cyber-attacks can be detected by using
power usage profiles. Similar power-based cyber-attack
detection techniques have emerged for detecting cyberattacks in other domains (or computing systems) by collecting power profiles. For example, smartphones with
in-band power collection [11], medical devices with AC
power [12], and software defined radio [13].
J.Ho↵man et al. [11] tried to detect smartphone malware by analyzing the power consumption of the device.
However, this approach failed due to the noise caused by
unpredictable users and environment interactions. Empirical tests with both artificial and real-world malware
indicated that the additional power consumed by such
apps was too small to be detectable with the mean error-

rates of state-of-the-art measurement tools.
A similar approach was tested on an embedded medical device and a compounder by S. Clark et. al. [12].
Supervised machine learning techniques (i.e., 3-nearest
neighbor, multilayer perceptron, and random forest)
were used to model permissible behavior and detect deviations. Experimental results showed that the three
techniques provide high detection rates, between 93.6%
and 94.4%, for detecting di↵erent types of malware.
A power fingerprinting approach was presented by
C. González et al. [13]. This approach relied on extracting distinctive power consumption signatures and
then used pattern recognition techniques to determine if
they matched expected behaviors. Preliminary results
showed the feasibility of this approach. This research
was expanded, and this method was used by the PFP
firm1 , which provides a commercial product that detects
anomalies on a device by analyzing its power consumption.
Our work is di↵erent from C. González et al. [13]. The
primary di↵erence is that we detect cyber-attacks by
collecting and analyzing the internal DC power utilization of the compromised devices. Moreover, we monitor
all the rails supplying power to the PLC, whereas they
only monitored power utilization of the central processor. In our previous work [14], we examined whether
malware (particularly rootkits) generates a detectable
signal in the power consumption of a general-purpose
computer. Unsupervised machine learning techniques
were used to analyze CPU and motherboard power
data measured from the power supply for detecting the
Alureon rootkit with a high detection rate.
In this paper, we monitor internal DC power of a PLC
for identifying di↵erent power profiles when the SCADA
systems were operated normally and maliciously. Our
work was based on the hypothesis that cyber-attacks
would require more of the device’s resources which
would be reflected in power usage. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first work to collect DC power of
SCADA devices for identifying cyber-attacks.

3.

Experimental Design

In this section, we first introduce the SCADA testbed
used for launching experiments and simulating cyberattacks. After that, we demonstrate the approach to
monitor PLC power consumption with detailed steps
for hardware configuration. We also discuss the DF-1
protocol, a communication protocol for exchanging messages between the HMI and PLC, and present the
data frame structure of DF-1 messages. We discovered
several vulnerabilities in the DF-1 protocol, exploited
these vulnerabilities, and successfully compromised the
SCADA testbed system by command injection attacks,
replay attacks and denial of service (DoS) attacks.

3.1

SCADA Testbed Hardware Configuration

The SCADA testbed consisted of two PCs and an
Allen Bradley SLC 5/03 7 slot PLC which was hosted
in a Allen Bradley CM-184 PLC Trainer. The Trainer,
1

http://www.pfpcybersecurity.com/
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designed for educational purposes, provided a panel of
switches and LED lights wired with relays for interacting with the PLC. One PC was used to establish a communication with the PLC via HMI software. The HMI
software was used to program, monitor, and control the
PLC. The second PC was used to save the data collected by a Data Acquisition System (DAQ). Only four
slots of the PLC were used in our experiments. A description of each slot is shown in Table 1. Operational
commands and responses were communicated between
the HMI application and the PLC through an RS232
cable. The main components of the SCADA testbed
are shown in Figure 3.

Table 1: PLC 7-Slot description
Slot #
Description
1
8K memory SLC-5/03 controller
2
Input interface (8 switches)
3
Output interface (8 LED lights)
4
Input and output interface
(1 switch and 1 LED light)
5-7
Unused
To monitor the power consumption of the PLC, we
probed the power supply unit (PSU) on the PLC printed
circuit board (PCB). We found four power rails in total.
Two +5V rails and one +24V rail are from the backplane of the PLC. The other +24V rail is an external
power supply for the output switches. Note that only
one of the +5V rails and one +24V rail were required
to supply the analog I/O modules of the PLC. Based
on the power consumption data we monitored for the
two +5V rails, we determined the +5V rail used by the
CPU board. We plot the figures of power consumption
data for this +5V rail and the +24V rail power supplied
by the backplane of the PLC in Section 5.
We used a 16-bit multifunction data acquisition
(DAQ) device [15] to collect digital power consumption
data of these four rails in real-time. The DAQ provides
power data with timestamps, is able to sample at a rate
of 250KHz, and can monitor up to 16 channels. The
DAQ was attached to the PLC’s power supply through
a DC current sensor board (described later) which provided both voltage and current data. For these experiments, we only monitored the three PCB voltage rails
(both of the +5V rails and one of the +24V rails). The
other +24V rail was on a di↵erent ground and confused
the results when we included it.
The main challenge we encountered while monitoring
the current consumption of the PLC was that the sensors we used in [14] were not sensitive enough to obtain
clear current signals in the mA range. To address this
challenge, a di↵erent breakout board (INA169 analog
DC current sensor) was used. The INA169 sensor [16] is
a “high-side current monitor”, which means that a shunt
resistor is placed on the positive power rail and measures the voltage drop across that resistor. This sensor
thus provides both voltage and current data. Figure 1
shows the analog DC current sensor that was used to
obtain the current consumption, while Figure 2 shows

the hardware configuration that was used for our experiments.

Figure 1: INA169
analog DC current
sensor

3.2

Figure 2:
Hardware configuration

DF-1 Protocol

The DF-1 protocol is an asynchronous byte-oriented
protocol used to communicate between the HMI and
the PLC via the RS232 link [17]. Figure 3 shows our
complete SCADA testbed. Legitimate users can control the SCADA testbed by sending commands to the
PLC through the HMI. RSLogix 500 [18] was the HMI
application we used for interacting with the PLC.

Figure 3: SCADA testbed
The data in the messages sent between the HMI and
the PLC were DF-1 protocol hex data in full duplex.
As a consequence, commands sent from the HMI to
the PLC were transmitted as hex bytes in the datalink layer. To simulate cyber-attacks on the SCADA
testbed, reverse engineering was performed on the hex
byte frames. Figure 4 shows a single data-link layer
command message frame of the DF-1 full duplex protocol that was transmitted from the HMI to the PLC,
Table 2 shows a description for each field of this message. See [17] for more details on the DF-1 protocol.
Our test PLC had a physical key on the front for
switching between Program, Run, and Remote modes.
We assumed this would provide a hard interlock preventing switching modes.
The DF-1 protocol contains commands for switching
modes. An example of a malicious code that could be
used by an attacker to change the PLC Run mode to
Program mode is 0x 10 02 01 00 0f 00 01 00 80 01
10 03 8f 29. An explanation of the message frame can
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also be found in Table 2. Note that the highlighted
0x01 character after “FNC” (0x80) is the optional Mode
field. Here 0x01 means changing the current mode to
the Program mode; 0x06 would place the PLC into Run
mode.

to Program Mode can be easily achieved by
sending the message shown in Figure 4.
– Response Injection: Attackers modify the reply messages sent from the PLC to the HMI.
By monitoring normal response messages, attackers could modify the bytes in order to
deceive the HMI as to the PLC’s true status
and vice versa.
– Replay: Attackers send repeated commands
to the PLC in order to control the system. Attackers first sni↵ legitimate commands that were sent from the HMI to the
PLC, then record these commands and resend them to the PLC in a malicious way.
This can be to confuse or disable the device.

Figure 4: DF1 Full duplex data-link layer message frame

• Spoofing: Introducing software on the controlling
PC that mimics the HMI software.

Table 2: Meaning of DF-1 full duplex data-link
layer message frame
Field/Symbol
DLE STX

DST
SRC
CMD
STS
TNS
FNC
ADDR
Size
Data

DLE ETX CRC
CRC

3.3

Meaning/Content
Sender symbol
separating the multi
multi-drop header
from data
Destination node
for the message
Source node for the
message
Command Code
Status Code
transaction number
(2 bytes)
Function Code
Address of memory
location (2 bytes)
Number of bytes
to be transferred
Data values
transferred by the
message
Sender symbol
terminating a
message
check characters
(2 bytes)

Example Packet

• Denial of Service: An attacker sends various commands via the RS232 link exhausting the PLC’s
CPU resources.

0x10 0x02
0x01
0x00
0x0f
0x00
0x01 0x00
0x80
0x10 0x03
NA

NA
0x10 0x03 0x8f
0x29
0x8f 0x29

Vulnerabilities of SCADA Systems

The forms of attacks against SCADA systems are different than those for general PCs. Vulnerabilities residing in the HMI computer, communication channels between the HMI and PLC, and software can be exploited
to compromise SCADA systems. Forms of SCADA attacks include:
• Communication Vulnerabilities: Messages sent by
the DF-1 protocol are not encrypted or protected.
Hex byte messages can be easily monitored and
fabricated. Examples of types of communication
vulnerabilities are:
– Sniffing: A Serial Protocol Analyzer tool
can be used to monitor and capture unencrypted communications transmitted between the HMI and the PLC.
– Command Injection: Attackers send malicious commands to change PLC operations.
As an example, changing the PLC Run mode

For our testbed system, as a Response Injection-type
attack, we composed a Python script that masqueraded
as the RSLogix 500 to the PLC with the objective to interject itself in between. As a consequence, the response
messages from the PLC were captured by the Python
script rather than being sent directly to the HMI. This
demonstrated a successful Man-in-the-Middle (MITM)
insertion that would allow the HMI and PLC to be manipulated independently.

4.

Data Collection

To collect precise data, a measurement computing
data acquisition system (DAQ) was used. The DAQ
device collected analog power consumption data with
the help of INA169 sensors, and converted analog data
to digital data which was sent to the data collection
PC running the TraceDAQ Pro application via a USB
cable. TracerDAQ Pro is an out-of-the box virtual instrument that displays and analyzes data and general
signals with a customized sampling time [19]. This tool
ran on a separate PC from the one running the HMI
software in order to provide reliability during the experimentation process. Data was saved as a CSV file.
The sampling time for collecting the power consumption
data for these experiments was one second.
We first collect power consumption data under two
normal scenarios. The first normal scenario had one
closed switch lighting one LED light. The second normal scenario had one closed switch lighting all eight
LED lights. This was a sanity check that demonstrated
that our power measurement system functioned correctly and could measure the di↵erence in power between these two normal scenarios.
The three attack scenarios we tested are command
injection attacks, replay attacks and denial of service
attacks, which were introduced in Section 3.3. For
command injection we remotely changed the operation
of the PLC to switch from run mode to program
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mode. This would allow the PLC to be unknowingly
reprogrammed by an attacker with enough knowledge
of the PLC. For the denial of service attack we sent
a large amount of communication packets to exhaust
the PLC’s resources. For the replay attack, sequences
of legitimate commands were captured, modified and
repeated to the PLC. Python scripts were written
to simulate these cyber-attacks on the experimental
machine.

5.

Experimental Results

As part of the data pre-processing, the voltage and
current for each of the monitored rails were multiplied
to obtain the power consumption of the PLC. The next
step was to compare normal behavior with the abnormal
behavior.
Our primary goal was to prove that there is a detectable di↵erence in the power profile between normal
behavior, termed normal, and behavior when under attacks, termed abnormal. To do this, we plotted the
normal data against the abnormal behavior.

5.1

Analysis for the +5V and +24V Rails

Several comparisons were made as part of our data
analysis. The first scenario tested was to verify the
power consumption of the PLC when one light was
turned on versus when all eight lights of the PLC
Trainer were on.
From the rails that were monitored, the +24V rail
and one of the +5V rails were the ones that showed an
increase in the power usage when all the lights of the
PLC Trainer were cycled. Figure 5 shows a comparison
of the PLC’s power usage for one light versus when all
the lights of the PLC were on for the +24V rail, while
Figure 6 shows the same comparison for one of the +5V
rails.

Figure 6: Comparing PLC’S power usage when
all lights were turned on vs. when one light was
turned on for one of the +5V rails
the di↵erence when a larger amount of power (switching more lights) was obviously occurring. Even in this
nascent phase, this type of comparison could be used
as a second-party verification system for a monitored
SCADA system to assure it is switching as it was designed.
For the cyber-attack scenarios, we compared normal
power usage of the PLC (one light of the PLC was
turned on) with the power usage when cyber-attacks
were simulated. The command injection attack changes
the mode of the PLC from running mode to program
mode. In other words, emulating malicious users attempting to disable a PLC, our Python scripts would,
over a ten second cycle, change the mode from run mode
to program mode after two seconds, then pause for eight
seconds before switching back. Therefore, the PLC was
in the program mode and was waiting for new commands. We did not send new commands, but kept the
PLC waiting for eight seconds and then changed the
PLC mode back to the running mode, in which mode
the PLC performed normally again. This was repeated
and power data was collected. Figure 7 and Figure 8
show a comparison of the PLC’s power usage when one
light was turned on versus the command injection attack for the +24V and +5V rails.

Figure 5: Comparing PLC’S power usage when
all lights were turned on vs. when one light was
turned on for the +24V rail
As expected, the power usage of the PLC increases
when all eight lights were turned on in comparison to
when only one light was turned on. Note that the +24V
rail monitored is being used by the PLC and is not supplying voltage to the lights themselves. We designed
this scenario as a confirmation of our system to measure

Figure 7: Comparing PLC’S power usage when
one light was turned on vs. command injection
attack for the +24V rail
As we can see from the figures, when the PLC operated normally, in which case all eight lights were flash-
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Figure 8: Comparing PLC’S power usage when
one light was turned on vs. command injection
attack for the +5V rail

Figure 10: Comparing PLC’S power usage when
one light was turned on vs. DoS for the +5V
rail

ing, the power consumption of the +24V rail was between 3 to 3.5 milliwatts. When the PLC mode was
changed to the program mode, the power consumption
dropped to 1 milliwatts, which was even lower than the
power consumption of the normal scenario when one
light was turned on. Similar patterns can be found in
Figure 8. This experiment validated that the power consumption feature can be adopted to easily distinguish
normal scenarios and command-injection attacks.
We also simulated a Denial of Service (DoS) attack
and collected power consumption data of the PLC.
In this scenario, malicious users kept sending a large
amount of diagnostic node requests to read a block of
status information from the RAM of PLC. The PLC
was therefore busy with receiving messages and replying with status information. Since the PLC processor
only allows up to 4,096 inputs and outputs and the
instruction memory capacity is only 8K, the PLC resources were exhausted immediately after DoS attacks
were launched, thus DoS attacks prevented legitimate
usage of the PLC. Figure 9 and Figure 10 show a comparison of the PLC’s power usage when one light was
turned on versus +24 and +5 rails power usages when
the PLC was under the DoS attack.

attacks and one light on, when comparing the DoS data
with another normal case when all lights turned on, the
di↵erences are not pronounced.
Finally, we emulated the replay attack. In this scenario, malicious users sniffing normal commands sent
from the HMI to the PLC and resent them to the PLC
to retrieve useful information. As shown in Figure 11
and Figure 12, replay attack power consumption data is
much higher than the normal case with one light turned
on.

Figure 11: Comparing PLC’S power usage when
one light was turned on vs. replay attack for the
+24V rail
Therefore, we can easily distinguish replay attacks
from the normal scenario. Note that we did not compare
various attack benchmarks but comparing each attack
benchmark with the normal benchmark since this paper aims to prove that there is a detectable di↵erence
between SCADA normal and abnormal operations. In
the future, we will compare attack data and use unsupervised techniques to identify and classify attacks
regarding to the PLC power consumption.

Figure 9: Comparing PLC’S power usage when
one light was turned on vs. DoS for the +24V
rail
From the figures we can see that the PLC power consumption was much higher than the normal scenario.
Although we can distinguish the power profiles of DoS

6.

Conclusion

This paper presents how we developed a SCADA
testbed with the objective to detect cyber-attacks by
monitoring and analyzing the power consumption of a
PLC. The power consumption of the PLC was monitored under three attack scenarios: command injec-

2920

[8]

[9]

[10]
Figure 12: Comparing PLC’S power usage when
one light was turned on vs. replay attack for the
+5V rail
tion, DoS, and replay. Results shown that these cyberattacks leave a detectable signal on the power consumption of a PLC.
For the cases that were difficult to distinguish, we plan
to apply new techniques, which we have successfully applied on general-purpose computers to detect minute
changes in power signals caused by malware. We are
also planning to apply unsupervised machine learning
techniques to discern these signals. Machine learning
can take advantage of the the repetitive nature of PLCs
(i.e., they generally perform a few tasks repeatedly) in
normal operation. Furthermore,we will also attempt to
characterize the types of cyber-attacks using machine
learning techniques.

7.

[11]
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